Davies's Disguise in The Caretaker
—From the Views of Modernist Negation and the Tradition of Disguise—

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When an old tramp in Pinter's The Caretaker (1959), whose "real name" is "Mac Davies", is brought to Aston's room by him and says "I been going around under an assumed name," "Bernard Jenkins" (29), we know that he has two identities, and now is disguising himself as Jenkins. The distinguished Shakespearean scholar, M. C. Bradbrook defines "disguise as the substitution, overlaying or metamorphosis of dramatic identity, whereby one character sustains two roles" (160). His case is considered to be the overlaying of dramatic identity. Seemingly it is a little difficult for us to distinguish Davies's role and Jenkins's one, but as it is true that the tramp at the outset of the play is conscious of his past self ("I've eaten my dinner off the best of plates" 18) and his present one ("I might have been on the road a few years" 18), we may argue that he has two selves, and the disguise which the change of name shows confirms it. If so, we wonder what his real self (Davies) and his assumed one (Jenkins) are really like. This essay attempts to illuminate these two selves and how Davies's disguise which produces the two selves works from the views of modernism and the tradition of disguise.

1

Because he so often asserts that "my papers" at Sidcup "prove who I am" (28, 29), and his main concern through the drama is to go there to collect them, so that he can "prove everything" (29), and "be fixed up" (25) without roving anymore, it would be no doubt that this tramp has the real identity or self besides his assumed one. And when we look for some outstanding features of his which tell the actual state of it, from his rambling speeches, we take note of his self-assertion and self-respect first of all. When he is offered a cigarette by Aston, he refuses it and, instead, he asserts that "I'll have a bit of that tobacco there for my pipe, if you like" because "It was knocked off on the Great West Road" (17). He asserts himself cogently based on the cause and effect principles. His self-esteem is shown when "the guvnor

give me the bullet" for the unjust reason of his "making too much commotion": "I told him that.... nobody's got more rights than I have. Let's have a bit fair play" (19). His words betray his consciousness of his position as "Promethean man" in spite of his appearance as a shabby tramp. It was the people's "treating me like dirt" (17) and imposing an unreasonable and extra job on him that caused him to complain at his workplace:

> DAVIES. Comes up to me, parks a bucket of rubbish at me tells me to take it out the back. It's not my job to take out the bucket! They got a boy there for taking out the bucket... My job's cleaning the floor, ...doing a bit of washing-up, ... (18)

Though he "might have been on the road" (19), he is proud of having been a human being or bourgeois ("I've had a dinner with the best" 18). Judging from these speeches, he is much like a traditional man who "had some idea how to talk to old people with the proper respect," ...and was " brought up with the right ideas" (19).

That is the reason why he gets angry, being treated as a dog or wild animal when he went to the monastery at Luton where he had heard a pair of shoes were given, but "Piss off" (23) was their reply with only a meal as small as a bird could eat being served: "Meal they give me! A bird...a little tiny bird, he could have ate it in under two minutes. Right, they said to me, you've had your meal, get off out of it. Meal? I said, what do you think I am, a dog? Nothing better than a dog. What do you think I am, a wild animal ?" (23-24).

These inhuman anecdotes and his human anger in them induce us to suppose that Davies's self is the "old 'liberal humanist' self" (Eagleton 91) or "the autonomous, unified self-generating subject postulated by essentialist humanism" (Dollimore 155), which is pervasive since the Enlightenment through the nineteenth century when the view of the world is a mechanistic Newtonian one. The figure of this man is called "Rational Man and Promethean Man" (Baumer 87). But this traditional self which was cultivated mainly by the Enlightenment thought had ironically a possibility of embracing barbarism because "implicit in the beginning of the Enlightenment, in Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel was the synthesis of reason, domination, and myth that was...put into practice in Auschwitz" (Herf 233-34). Its phase of barbarism seems to be projected on his hostility to aliens such as "Poles, Greeks, Blacks" (17). That he has such a 'humanist self' is clear in his antithetical behaviors in which whereas he persists in his white Britishness ("fair's fair," 27, "I was! [born and bred in the British isles]", 42), he emphasizes Blacks' dirtiness ("Blacks...using the lavatory... it was all dirty in there" 68).

Even if the liberal humanist self which the first identity, Davies represents is problematic, its essential presence in him would be glimpsed from a reading of realism as above. But may

we think that all of Davies's speeches are true and trustworthy, following only a mode of reading from realism? Pinter is such a writer as says, " there can be no hard distinctions between what is real and what is unreal, nor between what is true and what is false" ("Writing" 11). He can be regarded as one of modernists whose awareness is double, as Michael Bell says: "They (Several of the greatest works of modern literature) use realist representation, . . . yet with an X ray awareness of its (the world's) constructed, or purely human character" (12). To be short, he is a writer who sees the world both objectively and subjectively.

From another similar viewpoint of modernism (especially high modernism), a principle of modernist negation, Varun Begley says in his analysis of The Caretaker, "The Caretaker might be described as quasi-realism, though I would argue that The Caretaker . . . negates the realities it intermittently signals," based on "a principle of modernist negation that encourages and then complicates social interpretation (i.e. realism)" (48). He suggests that the inhuman monastery anecdote might be Davies's fiction, not truth:

> The army of incongruities arrayed against interpretation is led by the monk who tells Davies to 'piss off out of it.' 'If you don't piss off,' he reportedly says, 'I'll kick you all the way to the gate.' The inappropriateness (to say the least) of this response, its clipped, skeptical diction, posits an elemental doubt about the value of the anecdote —··· (62)

From modernist negation, Begley implies the fictiveness of Aston's anecdote of electroshock treatment, too, citing John Arden's remark: "Aston's story 'is highly detailed and circumstantial. But it is true? . . .'" (48), and he continues to argue about Davies's sporadic hostility to Blacks that "Davies is certainly problematic as a vehicle for such a critique (of English racism)" (49).

Aside from Aston's story, if Davies's description of the monastery and his hostile references to Blacks are not worthy to be trusted, the liberal humanist self itself in one of his identities, Davies, also becomes fictive, not essential, as the self presupposes and depends on his remarks' truth. Back to the argument of the disguise motif, the first self, "the autonomous bourgeois monad or ego" (Jameson 15) which the first identity, Davies, seems to have represented would be considered to be fictive, not real.

2

What can we see in the second identity, Jenkins as a tramp, which disguise brings forth? What self is observable in the assumed Jenkins? He thinks his position or role as tramp is temporary. He says, "I might have been on the road a few years." As "I left them ('my

papers') with him ('A man I know')" at Sidcup, "I'm stuck without them" (29), but " If only I could get down to Sidcup," he can "sort all that out" (29). While he is a wandering tramp, he is, as it were, a runaway, too.

> DAVIES. I got an insurance card here... under the name of Jenkins... It's got four stamps on it... But I can't go along with these. That's not my real name, they'd find out, they'd have me in the nick. (29)

When he is offered the job of caretaker by Aston, and hears from him that "I could fit a bell at the bottom," so that "you could answer any queries" (52), he refuses to fit a bell, being afraid of his pursuers: "I'd go down there, open the door, who might be there,... They might be there after my card" (53). Thus we know that he lives in fear and anxiety every day; moreover he is also put in alienation. When he was working at the restaurant probably, "Ten minutes off for a tea-break in the middle of the night in that place and I couldn't find a seat, not one... all them aliens had it" (17), only he was excluded from company.

This situation in which he is put now is out of doubt that of the "new" modernity which Baumer refers to (402). The "new" modernity started from a revolution in European thinking in the twentieth century of which Heisenberg's 'Uncertainty principle' is representative, and it produced "the new mentality" of "the famous three a's... the Absurd, anxiety, and alienation" (Baumer 414). In the world of the new modernity, the ideas of the objective and the absolute disappeared, "all realities have become subjective fictions" (Bradbury and McFarlane 27). The roaming and downtrodden Jenkins is surrounded by this kind of absurd, existential and phenomenological atmosphere in which we find his identity also fittingly fictitious, due to disguise.

It is needless to say that this world is that of modernism where the self is no longer seen as unified and essential, but split or incoherent and becomes fictitious[1]. It is this kind of self that we can observe in Jenkins, the second identity by disguise. As Baumer argues that "this situation (the new modernity) gave European man (the opportunity) to improvise and create" (403), so Jenkins improvises stories as if he were a modernist. He is called a liar at last by Mick:

> I can take nothing you say at face value. Every word you speak is open to any number of different interpretations. Most of what you say is lies. (82)

As Lois G. Gordon says that the tramp "introduces himself as Davies to Aston, but as Jenkins to Mick" (42), he describes to Aston the inhuman experience in the monastery as Davies, but as Jenkins he might have created the stories like the monastery anecdote.

Jenkins as improviser is very often glimpsed in his casual speeches. In order to testify to his cleanness he says he "left [his] wife" after fortnight after he married, because she put "A pile of her underclothing, unwashed" into "The pan for vegetables" (18), but the story is doubtful because he replies nonchalantly ,"Don't you worry about that" when Aston says "The blanket'll be a bit dusty" (27-28). He says to Aston "I might get down to Wembley later on in the day" because in a cafe "they were a bit short-handed and "want an Englishman to pour their tea" (36), but to Aston's later question "How did you get on at Wembley," he replies, "Well, I didn't get down there" (48). He improvised a story of Wembly.

Clearly he is a liar. Mick who suspects Jenkins is a liar leads him to betray his nature of improvisation.

> MICK. You been in the services. You can tell by your stance.
> DAVIES. Oh . . . yes. Spent half my life there, man. Overseas . . .
> MICK. In the colonies, weren't you?
> DAVIES. I was over there. I was one of the first over there. (59-60)

Mick functions through the drama as a medium by which the actual state of Jenkins or the self in him is illuminated. When he hears an old tramp's name is "Jenkins" (39) for the first time, he says, "You remind me of my uncle's brother" (40):

> He was always on the move, that man . . . had a funny habit of carrying his fiddle on his back. Like a papoose. I think there was a bit of the Red Indian in him . . . I've never made out how he came to be my uncle's brother. I've often thought that maybe it was the other way round. I mean that my uncle was his brother and he was my uncle . . . You spitting image he was. (40)

Jenkins is said to resemble Mick's uncle's brother whose identity is very enigmatic. But is the man really his uncle, or a blood relative? Is he British or a foreigner? Further Mick says, "you've got a funny kind of resemblance to a bloke I once knew in Shoreditch" who "lived in Aldgate . . . was brought up in Putney . . . was born in the Caledonian Road" (40), and he continues his resemblance game, saying, "you remind me of a bloke I bumped into once, just the other side of the Guildford by-pass" (43). With the variety of Jenkins's doubles, a sense of unreality in them and their geographical diversity would suggest and reflect Jenkins's incoherent or decentralized self. His self is literally fictitious as his disguise as Jenkins symbolizes.

But is Jenkins as tramp only a role like a fiction with no reality? Here we have a hint about an answer to this question from a motif of boots which is found throughout the

drama in Jenkins's persistence in a search of a pair of shoes just right for him, in which he wants to go to Sidcup. Begley compares the boots in Van Gogh's painting A Pair of Boots with "my old ones (broken-down shoes)" (24) which a tramp, Jenkins tries to substitutes for new ones at a monastery. According to Begley,

> Van Gogh's painting first may be read as a restoration of the objective world of peasant toil and agrarian misery from which the boots were concretely derived. This first stage we might call a realist gesture. (59)

Begley remarks the humanist iconography in this realistic reading of Gogh's boots, and suggests that Pinter's mode of description of Davies's old shoes derives from Gogh's humanism.

> The familiarity of the humanist iconography surrounding old shoes is partly the result of painters like Van Gogh, and traditional values concerning poverty and degradation are forcefully recalled in Davies's retorts: 'What do you think I am, a dog? What do you think I am, a wild animal?' Like Van Gogh, Pinter seems to be marshalling the potent force of modernist synecdoche — using the shoes as markers of a long-lived experience of suffering… (62)

As Begley puts it, it would be certain that Jenkins or Davies who assumes a roll of a tramp, "days without food," wandered "the expressways near Hendon and around London in search of forgotten friends, employment, and sustenance" (62), and daily goods such as soap and shoes.

> DAVIES. I was never without a piece of soap, whenever I happened to be knocking about the Shepherd's Bush area. (22)
>
> DAVIES. …it's taken me three days to get here, I said to him, three days without a bite,…I…picked up a pair there. Got onto the North circular, just past Hendon, the sole come off, right where I was walking. (23-24)

From such a realistic mode of reading as in the case of Gogh's boots, Jenkins's miserable life would be true and confirm the reality of the humanist self in him. With respect to the monastery anecdote by Davies/Jenkins, Begley argues: "Davies certainly comes across as an inveterate liar… At war with the wild implausibility of what is recounted, however, is the authentic indignation and puzzlement emanating from the speech" (61). If Begley 's insistence on the authenticity in the tramp's anger at the monk's abuse is right in spite of his recognition of the falsehood of Jenkins's speech, the fictitious identity or self born of disguise

turns out to be a true one. A false self has changed into a true one.

3

This kind of paradox as to disguise has a precedent in a fin-de-siècle British drama. It can be seen in Wilde's The Importance of Being Earnest (1895) where Jack disguises himself as Ernest. In this disguise, the first identity is Jack Worthing, which must be true properly speaking, but is false or fictitious . The reason is that when he was a baby, he was found in a hand-bag left in a cloak room at Victoria Station by Thomas Cardew, who "happened to have a first-class ticket for Worthing" (333) then, and named him Jack Worthing. Jack, who is "serious" and "has a higher sense of duty and responsibility" (340) in his country, disguises himself as "profligate Ernest" (336) when he comes up to London and associates with Algernon, a man of dandyism. Ernest, the second identity, born of disguise, is a fictitious one, but it turns out to be a true one at the denouement:

> JACK: Now, what name was I given?
> LADY BRACKNELL: Being the eldest son you were naturally christened after your father.
> . . . .
> LADY BRACKNELL: Yes, I remember now that the general was called Ernest. (382-83)

This disguise pattern shows paradoxically that the first identity, which must be true, is a false one whereas the second, the assumed one, is a true one. This paradox reminds us of Wilde's aesthetic "third doctrine." It is the doctrine that "Life imitates Art" ("Decay" 992). This doctrine can be paraphrased as reality ("Life") comes from fiction ("Art"). In Jack Worthing's case, a real identity came from a fictitious one, Ernest. This disguise pattern makes its novelty conspicuous when compared with the preceding ones in British drama history. Here I'd like to look back at the tradition of disguise[2].

The first pattern is observable in dramas in the age of the Renaissance when man is still considered to be a microcosm reflecting the macrocosm. In this era the self has the unified multiplicity which reflects the ultimate One like a Protean man in Pico Della Mirandola's oration On the Dignity of Man (Wind 158): "thou (Adam) mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer" (225). The disguise motif in this era reflects this type of man. Therefore both the first identity or a native self and the second identity or an assumed self in disguise are true, not fictitious. The two selves are united as discordia concors. In The Merchant of Venice (1596-7), Portia who disguises herself as the lawyer Balthazar, becomes

androgynous, her native woman and the assumed man being combined[3]. Portia / Balthazar unites Mercy, represented by the former, and Justice, by the latter, which are "the contrary aspects of one deity: the God of vengeance is the God of love. His justice is mercy" (Wind 95). Portia / Balthazar, as it were, as microcosm, reflects the macrocosm or the One. In this era the cosmic order was seen as embodying the Ideas in teleological thinking.

On the other hand, when the mechanistic Newtonian world supplants the world of the chain of being, the view of man changes. Its change has a close relation to the emergence of liberal humanism. According to Catherine Belsey,

> Liberal humanism, laying claim to be both natural and universal, was produced in the interests of the bourgeois class which came to power in the second half of the seventeenth century. (7)

Though Jonathan Dollimore argues that this "essentialist humanism . . . only really emerges in the Enlightenment" (156), it produces the "liberal humanist self," which is autonomous, unified, and self-generating, as referred to above. The figure of this man is sometimes called "Promethean man" (Baumer 87), and it is pervasive till almost the end of the nineteenth century. Baumer calls this period of a new world and a new man or self "old" modernity (402) in contrast with "new" modernity after the twentieth century scientific revolution.

Back to the motif of disguise, this period engenders the second type of disguise. The first identity or the native self in disguise is essential or true whereas the second one or the assumed self is fictitious or false. Disguise, as it were, represents "Kant's duality of noumenal and phenomenal selves" (Eagleton 90)[4]. In other words disguise hides the true or essential self, and shows the temporary or false one, but the noumenal one is seen through. This disguise sometimes takes a form of transparent disguise. It can be observed in Shakespeare's final romances.

> With the final romances . . . their disguises become transparent. In Cymbeline . . . Imogen in her page's disguise, her brothers and Belarious disguised as peasants, Cloten in Posthumus' garments, and Posthumus himself, as the poor soldier, change their habits merely; the characters are constant. So in The Winter's Tale the royalty of Perdita shows through her lowly habits . . . (Bradbrook, Growth 93)

Her argument suggests that these characters' noumenal selves are constant or essential despite their disguise, whereas their assumed or phenomenal selves by disguise are only appearances or constructs[5]. William Wycherley also uses this transparent disguise. In The Country Wife (1675), Pinchwife makes her wife Margery disguise herself as her brother to

prevent her infidelity, but the rakish Horner sees through her female identity under her male disguise, and kisses 'him', saying, "give her (Margery) this kiss from me" (3.2.485).

In this way consideration of a tradition of disguise makes us guess that the disguise motif has a close relation to the view of the world and man contemporaneous with each type of disguise. It seems that Wilde's disguise also reflects such a background, and its novelty makes us perceive a symptom of the radical change of the trend of thought or the new modernity. The age of the new modernity is one of double awareness. By the twentieth scientific revolution the external world which had been considered to be absolute and mechanistic proved to be illusory. Though a table had been thought to be a solid plane till then, the knowledge was false. A table turns out to be "a mass of moving particles" by new science, and we have learned to accept "the recognition that science is a construction of the human mind before it is a reflection of the world" (Bell 11). This recognition suggests that the world is seen and caught subjectively, and the real comes from the subjective. To say simply, reality is born of fiction. Ernest in Wild foretells this new view.

But Bell says that the "physicist continues to live in the Newtonian world of the layman" (12), too. This idea being applied to literature, it can be said that a writer lives in the world of realism. Wild lives there too, and tries to realize Jack's "self-development" like in the nineteenth century bildungsroman. But he does it through disguise. He develops Jack's self into Ernest's, and as Ernest is similar to Algernon in dandyism, Ernest's self is a dandy's. Wilde says about a selfish man[6] "the primary aim of his life is self-development" ("Soul" 1101) and Susan Laity argues that "Earnest concerns the self-realization of the individual, the development of the soul" (135), and adds that "Jack must develop into a dandy" (135). Ernest was the potential Algernon. Algernon's disguise as Ernest would prove this potentiality. For Algernon, who takes an interest in Cecily disguises himself as Ernest, calling it "Bunburying" (338), goes to see her in Woolton. Algernon as well as Jack disguises himself as the same 'Ernest'. Surely the correspondence of two persons through disguise or 'Ernest' confirms Jack's self-realization into a kind of Algernon's self. In this way the real Ernest or self is born of the false Ernest or self by way of disguise. This disguise in Wilde is clearly different from that in the era of the old modernity where the second self disguise produces was literally false like the new self as Margery's brother produced by Margery's disguise in The Country Wife.

4

I have argued so far that the Davies's disguise as Jenkins, a tramp, in Pinter is similar as Jack's disguise as Ernest in Wilde in the point that the first or native identity or self is false whereas the second one in disguise is true. In other words, among the two selves in disguise,

the 'real' self is false while the fictitious self is true.

But is the type of disguise in Pinter the same as the one in Wilde? Does Davies's self develop into Jenkins's one by way of disguise? The answer is No. One of the reasons is that there is no idea of self-development in Pinter's drama, and another is that as there is a problem of "the difficulty, or indeed, impossibility of verification" (Esslin 34) in Pinter, we can't verify which identity is true, Davies or Jenkins. And the third is a principle of modernist negation.

Though we might discern the humanist self in Davies/Jenkins from the realist reading, we also detect the incoherent or split self in him from modernist negation. This is because all of Jenkins's/Davies's utterances are doubtful in truth. As to our interpretation of his speeches, Begley argues, "the hermeneutic gesture begins to encounter resistance. A realism of old men walking Hendon expressways? Of discourteous monks? " (62). There is a comical example in which his lie and split self are combined. When Jenkins/Davies tries to win Mick's favour to banish Aston from Mick's house without letting him rebuild it, he pretends to be an interior decorator who rebuilds Mick's house in Aston's stead: "I could decorate it out for you, I could give you a hand in doing it..." (72). But afterward when Mick says "you say you're an interior decorator", he denies his words: "I never touched that. I never been that" (80-81). Mick who sees through a "bloody poster" in Davies/Jenkins inflates his identity as interior decorator more and more exaggeratedly.

> MICK. ...I want a first-class experienced interior decorator. I thought you were one.
>
> . . . .
>
> MICK. ...I understood you were an experienced first-class professional interior and exterior decorator.
>
> . . . .
>
> MICK. You wouldn't be able to decorate out a table in afro-mosia teak veneer, an armchair in oatmeal tweed and a beech frame settee with a woven sea-grass seat? ... (81)

Jenkins/Davies upon whom this swollen or unknown self has been thrust cry at last: "I never said that!" As it were, an image of his alter ego begins to walk beyond his control. This is a comical caricature of his self's division as is seen in his pretension of an interior decorator. Or it is an absurdly comical proliferation of his self[7]. Generally speaking, he pretends to be a multiple man. When Aston suggests he was tempted by a girl in a cafe ("she said, how would you like me to have a look at your body?" 34), he pretends to be a gigolo ("Women? There's many a time they've come up to me and asked me more or less the same

question" 34) while he feigns to be a specialist in shoes and clothes: "Suede goes off, it creases, it stains for life in five minutes. You can't beat leather" (24) or "I know about these sort of shirts... Shirts like these, they don't go far in the winter time" (50). But his multiplicity isn't unified, but scattered. His self as tramp is split, and now to his bafflement another false self has been thrust upon him from outside absurdly. Mick points out how his self is split or inconsistent, saying ironically "You got two names. What about the rest?" (82).

This tramp's self is split diversely and unsubstantial. If so, are both Davies's self and Jenkins's self fictitious like a postmodern self? I'd like to say No to this question, too. We must read this drama in two modes of realism and modernist negation and in view of exchangeability of the two selves in disguise, the first seemingly true identity and second assumed false one, deriving from Pinter's insistence on the impossibility of distinction between truth and falsehood. Seen from the realistic mode, each self shows an aspect of the humanist self whereas each presents one of the split or inconsistent one, seen from the mode of modernist negation. Disguise in The Caretaker can be maintained to be one in which each self becomes both true or essential and fictitious or construct. It isn't a type of postmodern disguise. In a different context, Lloyd Davis argues that the "motif of disguise suggests that personal identity is not conceived as essentially or originally present... (4). This postmodern type of disguise would represent the disunited multiplicity or split of the self. It suggests that each self in the two selves born of disguise is fictitious. Disguise in The Caretaker, as it were, can be asserted to be located in between Wilde's type of disguise and the postmodern one. Each self in disguise can be both true and false in this play. We must remember one of Pinter's famous phrases: "A thing is not necessarily true or false; it can be both true and false" ("Writing" 11).

Notes

1. Baumer says, "Not only Beckett but many of the best known figures of contemporary European literature wrote...of a vanishing self, an incoherent self, a decentralized self, of a self that possibly did not even exist" (420).
2. See Makoto Hosokawa, Kyo to Jitu no Hazama de: Shakespeare no Disguise no Keifu (Between Essence and Construct: The Genealogy of Disguise in Shakespeare). (Tokyo: Eihosha, 2003), 33-64.
3. See Hosokawa, 126-54
4. Catherine Belsey sees the emergence of the liberal humanist subject (noumenal self) in Richard Brathwait's The English Gentleman (1630), and says that Brathwait argues that noumenal self is to phenomenal one what the sun is to clouds which hide the sun transitorily.

> Brathwait . . . asserts . . . the diachronic continuity of the subject. People may seem to change, he insists, but this is simply a matter of appearances, like clouds covering the sun. In time people's true dispositions emerge and these are unalterable being, 'so inherent in the subject, as they may be moved, but not removed.' (34)

5 . As to the transparent disguise in Cymbelline, The Winter's Tale, and The Tempest in Shakespeare's romances, see Hosokawa, 341-409.
6 . Wilde describes a selfish man as follows: "a man is called selfish if he lives in the manner that seems to him most suitable for the full realization of his own personality" ("Soul" 1101).
7 . The situation similar to this occurs in Algernon's disguise as Ernest in The Importance of Being Earnest. Algernon as Ernest is visited by a solicitor, Gribsby "at the suit of the Savoy Hotel Co. Limited for ￡762 14s. 2d." for dinners there (349), and he says, perplexed, "I never dine at the Savoy at my own expense" (350), but another Ernest as whom Jack disguises himself dined there. Algernon as Ernest, as it were, encountered the alter ego out of hand comically. We can see another similar case in Shakespeare's disguise of doubles or twin though the dramatic effects are a little different. Disguise of doubles is, according to Bradbrook, disguise which is defined as the substitution of dramatic identity or the mistaken identity. In The Comedy of Errors, Antipholus of Syracuse, a younger brother of twins is mistaken for his elder brother, Antipholus of Ephesus, and forces his brother to incur a series of misfortune comically where his brother is shut out from his house and suffers exorcism by his wife who mistook the younger brother for her husband.

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